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THREE QUESTIONS FOR THE
RIGHT TO VOTEAMENDMENT
RichardBriffault*
ShouldtheUnitedStatesConstitutionbeamendedtoguaranteetherighttovote?
To the average citizenand probably many lawyersthis almost certainly would
betakenasanabsurdquestion. Mostpeopleprobablyassumethattherighttovote
is, atleastinprinciple, alreadyguaranteedbytheConstitutionevenifourpractices
fallshortofourideals.1 But, infact, althoughtheConstitutionfrequentlyrefersto
the right . . . to voteand the Supreme Courts jurisprudence has long treated
voting as a fundamental rightthe right to vote per se isnowhereguaranteed. A
right-to-vote amendment would, in the words of the Reverend Jesse Jackson, [p]ut
the right to vote into the Constitution.2 Giventhefundamentalplaceoftherightto
voteinourthinkingaboutdemocracy, thatsoundslikeanincontestablygoodidea. But
the issue is not as simple as that. Amending the Constitution is sufficiently onerous
requiringinitialapprovalbytwo-thirdsofboththeHouseofRepresentativesandof
theSenate, folowedbyratificationbythelegislaturesofthree-fourthsofthestates3
thatonlytwenty-sevenamendmentshavebeenratifiedinthe226 yearssincethe
Constitutioncameintoeffect, withonlytwoamendmentstakingeffectinthelast
forty-fiveyears.4 Securingthepassageandratificationofaright-to-voteamendment
wouldinvolveamajoreffortofpoliticalwill.5 Woulditbeworththateffort?
ThisEssayaddressesthatquestionbyaskingandsketchingoutanswerstothree
furtherquestions: Whyhavearight-to-voteamendment? Whatwoulditsay? And
howwoulditaffectsomeofthemostpressingcurrentvotingissues? PartI addresses
* JosephP. ChamberlainProfessorofLegislation, ColumbiaLaw School.
1 As Rep. Mark Pocan (D-Wisc.) put it in proposing a right-to-vote amendment, this
rightissofundamentalthatmostAmericans, understandably, assumeitisalreadyenshrinedin
the Constitution. 159 CONG.REC. H2662 (dailyed. May16, 2013) (statementofRep. Pocan).
2 JesseL. Jackson, Sr., Put the Right to Vote into the Constitution, WASH. INFORMER
(Mar. 11, 2014), http://washingtoninformer.com/news/2014/mar/11/jesse-jackson-put-right
-vote-constitution/.
3 U.S.CONST. art. V. TheConstitutionalsoprovidesforanalternativeamendmentprocess
initiatedbythelegislaturesoftwo-thirdsofthestatescallingforaconstitutionalconvention,
forproposingamendments, which, again, wouldtakeeffectonlyifratifiedbythree-quarters
ofthestates. Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (ratifiedin1971);U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (ratified
in1992).
5 See JanaiS. Nelson, A Call for a Right-to-Vote Amendment on Constitution Day,
REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2013), http:/blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/09/17/a-call-for-a-right
-to-vote-amendment-on-constitution-day/.
27
28 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:27
thecasefortheright-to-voteamendment. Itsuggeststhattherearethreeconcerns
that support the push for an amendment. The first is simply expressivethe sheer
significanceoftherighttovoteinourpanoplyofpoliticalrightsrequiresthatitbe
expresslyguaranteedintheConstitution. Thesecondwouldusetheoccasionof
enactinganamendmenttocorrectrecentUnitedStatesSupremeCourtdecisionsthat
haveleftmanyobserversfeelingthattherighttovoteis, currently, inadequately
protected. Thethird, relatedtothesecond, wouldusetheamendmenttobolsterthe
roleofthefederalgovernmentinenforcingvotingrights.
PartII turnstotheissueofwhatwouldaright-to-voteamendmentsay. Thatturns
outtobeasurprisinglytrickyquestion. Overthelastdecade, atleastthreedifferent
right-to-voteamendmentshavebeenputforwardandtheydiffersignificantlyin
length, detail, andfocus.6 Virtuallyeverystateconstitutionincludesarighttovote
provision, yetthese, too, differintheirterms.7 Thedraftingissuesreflectthefactthat
therighttovoteisnotthenegativeprotectionagainstgovernmentactioncharacteris-
ticofmostofourrightsbutanaffirmativeprivilegetoparticipateinagovernment-
createdandgovernment-structuredelectoralprocess. Asaresultmanyright-to-vote
proposals specificallyand sometimes differentlyaddress both who has the right
to vote and governments authority to regulate voting.
PartIII considershow anamendmentcouldaffectsomeoftheprincipalcurrent
votingissues. Ofcourse, toaconsiderabledegreethatwillturnonthetextofany
amendment, asdiscussedinPartII. However, itseemsdoubtfulthatanylikely
amendment would address some hotly contested issuessuch as minority vote
dilution, partisangerrymandering, orballotaccessforthirdpartiesandindependent
candidatesthat do not directly involve casting ballots. It is also unclear whether
anamendmentwouldenfranchisecurrentlydisenfranchisedgroupsordirectlyad-
dress those controversial administrative regulationssuch as photo identification
or proof-of-citizenship requirementsthat can make it difficult for qualified voters
tovote. Muchwoulddependonjusthow vigorouslyCongressenforcestheamend-
mentandhowtheSupremeCourtappliestheamendmentandtheenforcementpower,
muchastherighttovoteandfederalenforcementauthorityundertheexistingvoting
amendmentsareshapedbyCourtdecisionsconcerningwhatconstituteappropriate
justificationsforgovernmentregulationsaffectingthevote, how narrowlytailored
thelaw mustbe, how muchevidenceagovernmentmustprovidetoshow thata
regulationiswarranted, andtheroleofthefederalgovernmentinourfederalsystem.
Althougharight-to-voteamendmentcouldsymbolicallyvalidatethecentralplace
ofvotinginourdemocraticorder, itspracticalsignificanceinactuallysecuringthe
right to votelike the right to vote todaywould likely turn on the future actions
ofCongressandtheCourt.
6 See JoshuaA. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND.L.REV.
89, 96 n.34 (2014).
7 See id. at 8990; see infra notes 8691 and accompanying text.
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I. WHY HAVE A RIGHT-TO-VOTE AMENDMENT?
A principal reason for a right-to-vote amendment is the factwhich would
probably come as a great surprise to most Americansthat the Constitution does not
currentlyprovidefortherighttovoteinanyelections, federal, state, orlocal. Tobe
sure, theConstitutionfrequentlyreferstovotingrights. ArticleI andtheSeventeenth
AmendmentprovidefortheelectionofmembersoftheUnitedStatesHouseof
RepresentativesandtheSenate.8 Section2 oftheFourteenthAmendmentprovides
forthereductioninrepresentationintheHouseofRepresentativesofanystatethat
denies the right to vote in federal or state elections to eligible citizens (except for par-
ticipation in rebelion [] or other crime).9 TheFifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth,
and Twenty-Sixth Amendments prohibit certain types of restrictions on voting
respectively, basedonrace, colororpreviousconditionofservitude;sex;nonpay-
mentofpolltaxoranyothertax(infederalelectionsonly);orageforpersonseigh-
teenorolder.10 Eachoftheseamendments(alongwiththeFourteenth) providefor
Congressional power to enforce . . . by appropriate legislation.11
However, noneofthesemeasuresactualyaffirmativelyprovidesforasubstantive
righttovote. ArticleI, Section2 andtheSeventeenthAmendmentleavethedetermi-
nation ofthequalificationsforvotingformembersofCongressto thestates,12
although Article I, Section 4 does give Congress the power to regulate the Times,
Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.13 The
Fourteenth Amendment does not provide citizens the right to vote as an explicit
liberty but instead details a potential penalty states wil suffer if they deny that right.14
And the other amendments all speak in the passive voice,15 providingmerelythat
the right to vote shal not be denied [or abridged] according to [one of the forbidden
criteria].16 Inshort, theConstitutioneitherpiggybackstherighttovoteonstate
decisionsorimpliestherightbynegatingvariousgroundsfordenyingthevote, but
itneverexplicitlygrantstherighttovotetoanyone.
8 U.S. CONST. art. I;U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §2.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XV;U.S. CONST. amend. XIX;U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV;U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI.
11 See sourcescitedsupra note10;U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §5.
12 They each provide that the Congressional electorate shall consist of the Electors in
eachState[who]havetheQualificationsrequisiteforElectorsofthemostnumerousBranch
of the State Legislature. U.S. CONST. art. I, §2.
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. Article I, Section 4 first gives the Times, Places, and Manner
powerofregulatingfederalelectionstothelegislaturesofthestatesbutthenprovidesthat
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such state laws. Id.
14 Douglas, supra note6, at96.
15 Id.
16 Id. (quotingU.S. CONST. amend. XIX).
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IfoneroleofaConstitutionistoexpressthevaluesthatareimportanttoa
society,17 this seems a major omission. Voting is one of the principal ways in which
citizens protect their liberties from government,18 andtherighttovotehaslong
been understood as a manifestation of full membership in apoliticalcommunity.19
A right-to-voteamendmentwouldprovidetheformal, textualrecognitionofthecen-
tralityofvotinginourdemocracythattheConstitutioniscurrentlymissing. Ifthe
SecondAmendmentrecognizesthatacentralvalueinoursocietyistherighttokeep
andbeararms,20 thensurelyitisappropriateforanotheramendmenttoexpressthe
importanceoftherighttovote. Moreover, aright-to-voteamendmentwouldsignify
thattherighttovoteisanAmerican right.21 UndertheConstitutionaswrittentheright
tovoteisessentialyastate-grantedright, albeitwiththestatessubjecttocertainnon-
discriminationrequirements. Consistentwiththestate-basednatureofthevotingright,
everystateconstitutionrecognizestherighttovote.22 A right-to-voteamendment
wouldnationalizetherightandmakeitanelementofnationalcitizenship, nota
derivativeofstatecitizenship.23
Althoughtheexpressivevalueofanamendmentwouldbeimportant, thatalone
cannotexplainthecurrentcallsforamendingtheConstitution. Afteral, althoughthe
righttovoteperseisnotprotectedbytheConstitution, constitutionallaw haslong
treatedthevoteasafundamentalright, andmodernSupremeCourtjurisprudence
hasgiventhevoterobustprotection. Asfarbackas1886, theCourtpronouncedthe
political franchise of voting to be a fundamentalpoliticalright, becausepreserva-
tive of all rights.24 Inthe1960s, theCourtmadeitclearthatvotingisafundamental
rightforthepurposesoftheEqualProtectionClauseoftheFourteenthAmendment.25
Applyingstrictscrutiny, theCourtfoundthattheEqualProtectionClauseinvali-
datedthepolltax,26 taxpaymentrequirementsforvotingonmunicipalbondissues27
17 Cf. ElizabethS. Anderson& RichardH. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
18 JamesA. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political
Influence:A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 898 (1997).
19 Id.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
21 AsRep. Pocan(D-Wisc.) putit, thepurposeoftheright-to-voteamendmentisforthe
Constitution to explicitly guarantee, without a doubt, the right of the American people to
vote. 159 CONG. REC. H2662, H2663 (dailyed. May16, 2013) (statementofRep. Pocan).
22 See Douglas, supra note6, at89.
23 As Jesse Jackson put it, most Americans do have a state right to vote, but they dont
have a citizenship right to vote. See Jackson, supra note2.
24 YickWov. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
25 See Harperv. Va. Bd. ofElections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holdingthatpolltaxesviolate
theEqualProtectionClauseoftheFourteenthAmendment).
26 Id.
27 CityofPhoenixv. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970);Ciprianov. CityofHouma, 395
U.S. 701 (1969).
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andinschoolboardelections,28 anddurationalresidencyrequirementslongerthanfifty
days.29 Thepoltaxdecisionwasparticularlystriking. TheTwenty-FourthAmendment
banningtheuseofthepolltax, butonlyinfederalelections, hadjustbeenratified
in1964;30 theCourtwentaheadin1966 andfoundthatapplicationofapolltaxin
any electionviolatedtheEqualProtectionClause.31 Goingbeyondtherighttocast
aballot, theCourtinvokedthefundamentalnatureoftherighttovotewhenitalso
heldthattheEqualProtectionClauserequiresthatvotesbeequallyweightedsothat
the one person, one vote doctrine applies to elections for state office32 andgeneral
purposelocalgovernments.33 TheCourtreadasimilarequalityprincipleintoArticleI,
Section2 whenitdeterminedthattheintrastateapportionmentofCongressional
districts must also satisfy one person, one vote.34 Undertheminorityvotedilution
doctrine, votingrulesthatmakeitundulydifficultforracialandethnicminoritiesto
electcandidatesoftheirchoicemayviolatetheEqualProtectionClause.35 TheCourt
alsodeterminedthattherighttovotecouldsupportsuccessfulchalengestostatebal-
lotaccesslawsthatmakeittoodifficultforthirdpartiesandindependentstowina
place on a states balot.36 Such laws may unconstitutionaly burden the right of quali-
fied voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.37
However, inrecentdecades, theCourthasbeenfarlessprotectiveoftheright
tovote. TheCourthasrefusedtousetheEqualProtectionClauseagainstpartisan
gerrymanders,38 hassharplycurtailedtheuseoftherighttovotetochalengestatelaws
thatburdenthirdpartiesandindependentcandidates,39 andhasrequiredproofof
28 Kramerv. UnionFreeSch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
29 Burnsv. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973);Marstonv. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973);Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
31 Harper, 383 U.S. at 663. For a critical assessment of the Courts failure to look to the
Twenty-FourthAmendmentinitspolltaxdecision, seeBruceAckerman& JenniferNou,
Canonizingthe Civil Rights Revolution:The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
63 (2009).
32 Reynoldsv. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);Grayv. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
33 See, e.g., Bd. ofEstimatev. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989);Averyv. MidlandCnty., 390
U.S. 474 (1968).
34 Wesberryv. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
35 See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 76570 (1973) (findingthatmulti-memberdistricts
wereusedinvidiouslytocanceloutorminimizethevotingstrengthofAfricanAmericans
andMexicanAmericans).
36 See Williamsv. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (holdingunconstitutionallawsthatmake
itvirtuallyimpossibletoaddthirdpartiestotheelectionballot).
37 Id. at30 (1968);see also Bullockv. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (invalidatinga
filing fee that made it difficult for some candidates to run and, thus, tends to deny some
voters the opportunity to vote for a candidate of their choosing).
38 See Viethv. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
39 See, e.g., Timmonsv. TwinCitiesAreaNew Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997);Munrov.
SocialistWorkersParty, 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
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discriminatoryintenttoestablishaviolationoftheconstitutionalminorityvotedilu-
tiondoctrine.40 AlthoughtheCourtstilappliesstrictscrutinytomeasuresthatplacea
severe burden on the right to vote, it employs a more relaxed and flexible stan-
dardofreviewtowhatitconsiderstobereasonable, nondiscriminatorylawsorregu-
lationsevenifthey, too, burdentherighttovote.41 Thestatusofthecoreoftherightto
votethe right to cast ones balot and have it countedalso at times seems precarious.
InRichardson v. Ramirez,42 the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendments excep-
tion for participation in rebellion or other crime to uphold state laws disenfranchising
felonsandex-felons.43 InBush v. Gore,44 theCourtemphasizedthattheConstitution
doesnotprovidearighttovoteforPresidentoftheUnitedStates, notingthatnotonly
does the individual citizen have no federal constitutional right to vote for electors
forthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesunlessanduntilthestatelegislaturechooses
a statewide election as the means to . . . appoint [its] members of the electoral colege,
but also that [t]he State, of course, after granting the franchise in the special context
of Article II, can take back the power to appoint electors.45 InCrawford v. Marion
County Election Board,46 theCourtupheldthepowerofstatestorequireregistered
voterstopresentgovernment-issuedphotoidentificationasaconditionforbeing
allowedtocastaballot.47 LastyearinArizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona48
the Court both underscored the states control over who is qualified to vote in federal
elections49 andsuggestedthestatesmayalsobealowedtorequirevoterstoprovidethe
proof the states deem necessary to determine whether a voter meets those
qualifications50a suggestion taken up by a federal district court when it held in March
ofthisyearthatstatescanrequireotherwiseeligiblevoterstoprovidedocumentary
proofofcitizenshipinordertobealowedtoregistertovoteinfederalelections.51
Thus, a critical second purpose of a right-to-vote amendment is to correct some
ofthesedecisions,52 expandthefranchisetoincludeexcludedgroups, andprovide
morerobustprotectionoftherighttovoteagainstarisingtideofstateadministrative
40 See CityofMobilev. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
41 See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 43334 (1992).
42 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
43 Id. at25.
44 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
45 Id. at104.
46 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
47 Id.
48 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).
49 Id. at 225759.
50 Id. at 225960.
51 Kobach v. United States Election Assistance Commn, No. 13-cv-4095-EFM-TJJ, 2014
WL 1094957 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 2014).
52 See Nelson, supra note 5 (citing the Supreme Courts infamous Bush v. Gore decision,
and the claim that a right-to-vote amendment would open the door to voting access for ex-
cluded groups, such as . . . citizens convicted of a felony).
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restrictionssuchasphotoID requirements, documentaryproofofcitizenshiprequire-
ments, limitsonvoterregistrationmobilizationefforts, androllbacksintheavail-
abilityofearlyvoting.53 A right-to-voteamendmentcouldaccomplishsomeofthese
goalseitherdirectlythroughexplicitprotectiveprovisionsorbyprovidingforstrict
judicialreview ofvotingregulationsthatburdentherighttovote. Assomeadvocates
havenoted, atleastsomestatecourts, applyingtheirstateright-to-voteamendments,
haveinvalidatedstateadministrativerequirements, likephotoIDs, thatwouldlikely
passfederalconstitutionalmuster.54 A right-to-voteamendmentcouldalsoaddress
limitationsontherighttovotethatarebuiltintotheConstitutionandcannotbead-
dressedthroughtheEqualProtectionClause, suchasthestructuringofrepresentation
ofCongressandtheElectoralCollegethroughthestates, therebydenyingelected
representationinthefederalgovernmenttoAmericancitizenswholiveoutsidethe
statesintheDistrictofColumbia, PuertoRico, andothernonstatejurisdictions.55
Third, aright-to-voteamendmentcouldbolsterCongressionalpowertoprotect
votingrights. Beginninginthe1960s, theSupremeCourtrepeatedlyupheldCongres-
sionalauthoritytovindicateandexpandvotingrights.56 South Carolina v. Katzenbach57
sustained Congresss power to bar literacy tests and require federal preclearance of
new voting rules in so-called covered jurisdictions that had a history of racial
53 Fordiscussionsofcurrentstatelaw challengestovotingaccess, seeVotingLaws
Roundup 2014, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (June16, 2014) http://www.brennancenter.org
/analysis/voting-laws-roundup-2014. See also J. MIJIN CHA & LIZ KENNEDY, DEMOS,
MILLIONS TO THE POLLS: PRACTICAL POLICIES TO FULFILL THE FREEDOM TO VOTE FOR ALL
AMERICANS 2627 (2014) (discussing new state laws restrict voter registration drives); id.
at 5052 (restrictive state voter ID laws).
54 See 159 CONG. REC. H2662, H2663 (dailyed., May16, 2013) (statementofRep.
Pocan) (notingthatWisconsinstatecourtsreliedontheright-to-voteprovisionofthestate
constitutiontoinvalidatealaw thatwouldhaverequiredphotoID andreducedregistration
opportunitiesandtheavailabilityofabsenteeballots);see also Weinschenkv. State, 203
S.W.2d201 (Mo. 2006) (enbanc) (invalidatingphotoID requirementundertheright-to-vote
provisionoftheMissouriConstitution). But see LeagueofWomenVotersofWisc. Educ.
Network, Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d302 (Wis. 2014) (findingphotoID requirementcon-
sistentwithright-to-voteprovisionofWisconsinConstitution). Tobesure, moststatecourts
simplytrackfederalright-to-votejurisprudenceevenwhentheyinterprettheright-to-vote
provisionsoftheirownstateconstitutions. See Douglas, supra note 6, at 10610.
55 TheTwenty-ThirdAmendmentprovidesfortheselectionofpresidentialelectorsfrom
theDistrictofColumbia. Butapartfrom theeffectofthisAmendment, onlycitizensofstates
canparticipateintheelectionofofficersofthefederalgovernment. See, e.g., Adamsv. Clinton,
90 F. Supp. 2d35 (D.D.C. 2000) (three-judgecourt) (percuriam) (dismissingclaimchallenging
failuretoprovideDistrictofColumbiarepresentationinCongress), affd, 531 U.S. 940 (2000);
IgartuadelaRosav. UnitedStates, 32 F.3d8 (1stCir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1049
(1995);accord IgartuadelaRosav. UnitedStates, 229 F.3d80 (1stCir. 2000).
56 See generally Ackerman& Nou, supra note 31, at 6369 (describing voting rights
casestheCourtbeganhearinginthe1960s).
57 383 U.S. 301 (1966);accord Lopezv. MontereyCnty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999);Cityof
Romev. UnitedStates, 446 U.S. 156 (1980);Georgiav. UnitedStates, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
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discriminationinvoting.58 The Court also subsequently upheld Congresss power
tobanliteracytestsnationwide59 (eventhoughtheCourthadpreviouslyheldthat
literacytestsforvotingarenotunconstitutional),60 upheld Congresss extension of
therighttovoteinfederalelectionsto18-year-olds(beforetheratificationofthe
Twenty-SixthAmendmentmade18-year-oldseligibletovoteinallelections),61 and
adopted a results test for proof of minority vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act
thatwaslessstringentthanthetesttheCourthadpreviouslyfoundtheConstitution
required.62 Indeed, CongressactedrepeatedlyundertheVotingRightsActof1965,
asamendedin1970, 1975, 1982, and2006, toprotectthevotingrightsofracialand
languageminorities.63 Using its Article I, Section 4 Times, Places, and Manner
power, CongressenactedtheNationalVoterRegistrationActof1993,64 whichfacil-
itatedvoterregistrationinfederalelections(andindirectlyinstateelectionsasitwould
becostlyforstatestomaintaintwosetsofregistrationprocedures), andtheHelp
AmericaVoteAct(HAVA),65 whichsetsminimum standardsforvotingsystemsused
inelectionsforfederaloffice(again, statesarelikelytousethesamestandardsfor
their own elections), including requiring states to permit provisional voting by
peoplewhoappearatapollingplacebutwhosenamesarenotontheofficiallistof
eligible voters; the ballot is provisional to the subsequent determination of the
voters eligibility.66
Again, however, theSupremeCourthasrecentlycalledintoquestionthescope
ofthefederalenforcementpowerundertheexistingConstitution. In2013, theCourt
inShelby County v. Holder67 invalidatedonfederalism groundstheprovisioninthe
2006 VotingRightsReauthorizationandAmendmentsActcontinuingtheoriginal
Voting Rights Acts formulapreviously sustained under the enforcement authority
provided by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendmentsfor determining what con-
stitutes a covered jurisdiction for purposes of the laws preclearance requirement,
therebyeffectivelyundoingthepreclearanceprovision, whichisarguablytheheartof
theAct.68 JustoneweekbeforeShelby County, theCourtinInter Tribal calledinto
questionthescopeofCongressionalauthoritytoregulatefederal electionsunder
Article I, Section 4 when it noted that the states constitutional authority to deter-
mine the qualifications for voting in federal elections means that it would raise
58 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 30205.
59 Oregonv. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
60 Lassiterv. NorthamptonCnty. Bd. ofElections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
61 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at112.
62 Thornburgv. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
63 See ShelbyCnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013);Thornburg, 478 U.S. at34;Mitchell,
400 U.S. at112.
64 42 U.S.C. §1973gg(2006).
65 42 U.S.C. §15301 etseq. (2006).
66 Id.
67 133 S. Ct. at 261517.
68 Id.
2014] THREE QUESTIONS FOR THE RIGHT TO VOTE AMENDMENT 35
seriousconstitutionaldoubtsifafederalstatuteprecludedaStatefrom obtainingthe
information necessary to enforce its voter qualifications,69 includingrequiringa
government-issuedphotographtoproveidentityorgovernment-issueddocuments
toprovecitizenship.70 TheCourtalsomentioned, butdidnotaddress, theargument
that registration is itself a qualification for voting within the meaning of Article I,
Section2 and, thus, entirelywithinthecontrolofthestates.71 Withmuchofthecur-
rentthreattovotingrightscomingfrom staterulesandregulationsdealingwiththe
registrationprocess, proofofeligibilitytovote, andaccesstoearlyvoting, absentee
voting, andprovisionalballots, federalpreclearanceofchangesthataffectcovered
jurisdictionsandfederalpowertoregulatethevotingprocessinfederalelectionsare
criticalbulwarksforprotectingtherighttovoteandundoingstaterestrictions. The
Supreme Courts erosion of federal enforcement authority offers another justification
foraright-to-voteamendmentwhichcouldprovidenew supportforCongressional
actiontoprotectvotingrightsjeopardizedbystatelegislation.72
Ofcoursewhetheraright-to-voteamendmentwouldeitherextendtherighttovote
ofitsownforceorprovidethebasisforCongressionalenforcementactionturnson
whatsuchanamendmentactuallyprovides. Thatisthesubjectofthenextsection.
II. WHAT WOULD A RIGHT-TO-VOTE AMENDMENT SAY?
Oneproblem withdiscussingaright-to-voteamendmentisthatmultipleversions,
withverydifferentprovisions, havebeenproposedoverthepastdozenyears.73 In
2003, RepresentativeJesseJackson, Jr., proposedamultisectionamendment74 that
69 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 225859 (2013).
70 Id. at2259. TheCourtalsotookaswipeatthe1970 decisioninOregon v. Mitchell,
422 U.S. 112 (1970), which upheld Congresss power to lower the voting age for federal
elections. TheCourtdismissedMitchell as of minimal precedential value because no
rationaleforthatdecisioncommandedthevotesoffivejustices. Inter Tribal, 133 S. Ct. at
2258 n.8.
71 Id. at2259 n.9.
72 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note5 (invokingShelby County inmakingthecaseforaright-
to-voteamendment);Jackson, supra note2 (same).
73 Someright-to-voteamendmentproposalslongpredatethecurrentdiscussionofsuch
an amendment. During the course of the debate within the Johnson Administration in 196465
over how to vindicate the voting rights of African Americans, thenDeputy Attorney General
NicholasKatzenbachsentPresidentJohnsonamemoregardinganamendmentthatwould
haveprohibitedthedenialorabridgementoftherighttovote, ofanycitizen, otherthanfor
(1) theinabilitytomeetaresidencyrequirementoflessthansixtydaysorminimum age
requirementssetbystatelaw;(2) aconvictionofafelonyforwhichnopardonoramnesty
hasbeengranted;(3) imprisonmentatthetimeofregistrationorelection;or(4) mental
incompetency. See Ackerman& Nou, supra note 31, at 9192 n.153. The measure, like all
otherright-to-voteproposals, wouldhavegivenCongressthepowertoenforcebyappropriate
legislation. See id. Thememo, however, apparentlyneverledtoaformalamendmentproposal.
See id. at 9298.
74 H.R.J. Res. 28, 108thCong. (2003).
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would: (1) guarantee the right of a citizen eighteen years of age and older to vote in
any public election held in the jurisdiction in which the citizen resides; (2) subject
alfederalorstatevotingregulationsthatdenyorabridgethevotetotherequirement
that they be narrowly tailored to produce efficient and honest elections; (3) require
states to administer their elections in accordance with election performance stan-
dards established by the Congress; (4) require states to adopt same-day voter regis-
tration;(5) eliminatetheso-calledfaithlesselectorproblem byrequiringpresidential
electorstovoteforthewinnerofthepresidentialelectioninthestatefrom whichthey
areappointed;and(6) giveCongressthepowertoenforcebyappropriatelegislation.75
Theamendmenthadforty-sevencosponsorsbutnevergotoutofcommittee.76 Repre-
sentativeJacksonsubsequentlyproposedthesameamendmentin2005,77 2007,78
2009,79 and2011.80 Theversionsafter2004 droppedthefaithlesselectorprovision
but otherwise remained the same. The 2005 version obtained the most cosponsors
fifty-fivebut no version ever got out of committee.81
A secondalternativeright-to-voteamendmentistheoneproposedbyProfessor
JaminRaskinin2004.82 Hisproposalwould: (1) guaranteepopularelectionofpresi-
dentialelectors;(2) providefortheelectionofpresidentialelectorsbytheterritories
andCongressionalrepresentationoftheDistrictofColumbia;(3) providethatalciti-
zensatleasteighteenyearsofagehaveboththerighttovoteandtobecandidatesfor
state executive and legislative offices and where applicable for Congress; (4) provide
that nothing in the amendment shall be construed to deny the power of Congress
or the States to expand voting rights to other disenfranchised persons; and (5) give
Congressthepowertoenforcebyappropriatelegislation.83 UnliketheJacksonpro-
posalafterthefaithlesselectorprovisionwasdropped, thismeasurecombinedabroad
recognitionoftherighttovotewithmeasuresaimedatextendingparticipationin
federalelectionstononstatecitizensandexpandingtherightsofcandidacy. Onthe
otherhand, unliketheJacksonmeasure, theRaskinmeasuredidnotaddressvoter
registrationandtheadministrationofelectionsorsetastandardforreviewingad-
ministrativerequirements.
A third, andmuchbriefer, alternativeproposalemergedin2013. WithJesse
Jackson, Jr.s departure from Congress in late 2012,84 RepresentativesMarkPocan
75 Id. Theproposalwouldhaveappliedthesamerequirementtoelectorschosenfrom the
DistrictofColumbia. Id.
76 BillTracking, H.R.J. Res. 28, 108thCong. (Lexis2003).
77 H.R.J. Res. 28, 109thCong. (2005).
78 H.R.J. Res. 28, 110thCong. (2007).
79 H.R.J. Res. 28, 111thCong. (2009).
80 H.R.J. Res. 28, 112thCong. (2011).
81 H.R.J. Res. 28, 109thCong. (2005).
82 JaminRaskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment for the U.S. Constitution:Confronting
Americas Structural Democracy Deficit, 3 ELEC. L.J. 559, 573 (2004).
83 Id.
84 Whileunderfederalinvestigationforfinancialimproprietiesinthefallof2012, Jackson
resignedfrom Congresscitinghealthconsiderations. MichaelS. Schmidt, Jesse Jackson Jr.
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(D.-Wisc.) and Keith Ellison (D.-Minn.) took up the cause. Their proposalwhich
is the only one currently before Congressconcisely, indeed tersely, provides: Every
citizenoftheUnitedStates, whoisoflegalvotingage, shallhavethefundamental
right to vote in any public election held in the jurisdiction in which the citizen resides
andthatCongressshallhavethepowertoenforcebyappropriatelegislation.85
Itcouldalsobeinstructivetolookattheright-to-voteprovisionsofstateconsti-
tutions, asthosehaveoftenbeensuggestedasamodelforfederalaction. Few, if
any, areassimpleasthePocan-Ellisonmeasure. NewYork, forexample, guarantees
therighttovotetocitizenswhoareeighteenyearsofageorolder, satisfyathirty-
day residency requirement, and have not been convicted of bribery, any infamous
crime, or election fraud.86 Theprovisionalsogoesonto, inter alia, defineresidence,
authorizeabsenteevoting, requirethelegislaturetoestablishavoterregistration
system andvoteridentificationbysignatures, andmandatethattheregistrationand
electionsystem beadministeredbyabipartisanboard.87 TheCaliforniaConstitution
begins with a simple Pocan-Ellison-like declaration that [a] United States citizen
eighteen years of age and resident in this State may vote, but then goes on to provide,
inter alia, that the Legislature shall define residence and provide for registration,
prohibit improper practices that affect elections, and provide for the disqualification
ofelectorswhilementallyincompetentorimprisonedoronparolefortheconviction
of a felony.88 Eventheconstitutionsofstateswhosecourtshavegonebeyondthe
SupremeCourtinpolicingrestrictiveidentificationrequirementsdonotsimplyguar-
antee a right to vote. The Missouri Constitution provides that [a]ll citizens of the
UnitedStates. . . overtheageofeighteenwhoareresidentsofthisstateandofthe
politicalsubdivisioninwhichtheyoffertovoteareentitledtovoteinalelectionsby
the people, but then goes on to authorize a voter registration system and conditions
eligibilitytovoteonbeingregistered, deniesthevotetothementallyincompetent,
and authorizes the denial of the vote to persons convicted of a felony or of a crime
connected with . . . the right of suffrage.89 Similarly, theWisconsinConstitution, after
also providing that [e]very United States citizen age eighteen or older who is a resi-
dent of an election district in this state is a qualified elector of that district, authorizes
Pleads Guilty: I Lived Off My Campaign,N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/us/politics/jesse-l-jackson-jr-pleads-guilty-to-wire-and-mail-fraud
.html. Jacksonsubsequentlyadmittedtotheimproperuseofcampaignfundsforpersonal
purposesandultimatelypledguiltytofederalmailandwirefraud. See AmandaBecker, Ex-
Rep. Jackson Reported to Admit to Campaign Finance Violations in Plea Deal, ROLL CALL
(Feb. 8, 2013, 1:01 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/ex_rep_jackson_reported_to_admit
_to_campaign_finance_violations_in_plea-222278-1.html.
85 H.R.J. Res. 44, 113thCong. (2013). ThismeasurewasrecentlyendorsedbyRev. Jesse
Jackson. See Jackson, supra note2.
86 N.Y. CONST. art. II, §§ 19.
87 Id.
88 CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 24.
89 MO. CONST. art. VIII, §2.
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thelegislaturetoenactlawsdefiningresidency, providingforvoterregistration, and
excludingfrom thesuffragepersonsconvictedofafelonyunlessrestoredtocivil
rightsoradjudgedincompetent.90 However, Wisconsin, similartotheRaskinproposal,
would permit the extension of the vote to additional classes subject to the approval
ofthevotersatageneralelection.91
Itisdifficulttodecidewhetheraright-to-voteamendmentisagoodideaor
worththepoliticaleffortnecessarytogetitratifiedwithoutknowingwhatthenew
constitutionaltextwouldsay;asthisbriefreviewofsomeamendmentproposalsand
stateconstitutionalprovisionsindicates, thereisnoagreementoneitherthescope
orcontentofsuchamendment. Indeed, theseproposalsandprovisionsraisethree
issuesthatanyright-to-voteamendmentwouldhavetoaddressandresolve. First,
whowouldqualifytohavetherighttovote? Therighttovotediffersfrom other
rightswhichareprotectionsfrom governmentinthatitisarighttoparticipateina
government-created political process. No provision or proposalnot even the concise
Pocan-Ellison measuresprovides for a universal right to vote. All define a cate-
goryofqualifiedvoters. Allbeginbylimitingthevotetoeighteen-year-oldresident
citizens, withdifferentdegreesofattentiontothemeaningofresident. Atthestate
level, some further narrowor permit the legislature to further narrowthe pro-
tectedclassofvotersbyexcludingorpermittingtheexclusionofconvictedfelons
and the mentally incompetent. Some of these measuresthe Raskin proposal and
the Wisconsin constitutionwould permit the expansion of the electorate beyond
thosewhoserightsareconstitutionalyprotected. Theothersleaveopenthepossibility
thattheguaranteeoftherighttovoteforsomedeniesittothosenotintheprotected
categoryat least not without another amendment.
Second and relatedly, voting entails the voters engagement with a government-
runadministrativeprocess. AstheSupremeCourthasnoted,
[c]ommonsense, aswellasconstitutionallaw, compelsthecon-
clusionthatgovernmentmustplayanactiveroleinstructuring
elections; as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regu-
lationofelectionsiftheyaretobefairandhonestandifsome
sortoforder, ratherthanchaos, istoaccompanythedemocratic
processes.92
Certainly, theremustbesomeprocessfordeterminingthatvotersmeetthequalifica-
tionssetorauthorizedbytheconstitution. Manyofthestateconstitutionsaddressthis
byexpresslyprovidingforvoterregistrationordirectingorauthorizingthelegislature
90 WIS. CONST. art III, §§ 12.
91 See id.;Raskin, supra note82.
92 Burdickv. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quotingStorerv. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,
730 (1974)).
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torequireregistration.93 Somestateconstitutionsalsoaddresstherulesforballoting,
eitherexpresslyorbyempoweringthelegislaturetoact.94 Ofcourse, registrationand
otheradministrativeaspectsofvotingsuchastherulesgoverningtheavailabilityof
absenteeballotsorearlyvoting, thelocationandnumberofpollingplaces, orthe
selectionandmaintenanceofvotingmachinerycanhaveadirectimpactontheright
to vote in practice. Election laws wil invariably impose some burden upon individual
voters. Each provision of a code, whether it governs the registration and qualifications
ofvoters, theselectionandeligibilityofcandidates, orthevotingprocessitself, inevi-
tably affectsat least to some degreethe individuals right to vote. . . .95 A federal
right-to-voteamendmentwilllikelypiggybackonstateandlocaladministrativerules,
procedures, andstructures, asthestatesandlocalgovernmentswillalmostcertainly
continuetheirhistoricroleofactualyrunningelections, includingelectionsforfederal
office. With186,000 precincts, 8,000 localelectionoffices, approximately200 million
registeredvoters, andalongtraditionofdecentralizedadministrationdueatleastinpart
toourhugenumberoflocalelections,96 itishardtoimaginehowitcouldbeotherwise.
Thedifferentfederalamendmentproposalsaddresstheissueoftheimpactofstate
administrationontherightsofqualifiedvotersdifferently. TheRaskinandPocan-
Elisonproposalsdonotaddressitatal, exceptperhapsbyimplicationinauthorizing
Congresstoenforcethearticlebyappropriatelegislation. TheJacksonAmendment
would have dealt with state and local administration in three waysin addition to gen-
eraly authorizing Congressional voting rights enforcementby mandating same-
dayregistration, explicitlyrequiringstatestoabidebyCongressionallyprescribed
election performance standards, and setting a narrowly tailored to produce efficient
and honest elections standard for federal and state regulations that affect voting
rights.97 Thesewouldeffectmajorchangesinregistration, theuniformityofelection
practices, andthejudicialreview ofvotinglaws.
Third, someoftheseproposalsaddressveryspecificissuesinadditiontothemore
abstractconceptoftherighttovote. MuchoftheRaskinmeasuredealswithvotingin
federalelectionsbyAmericancitizenswhodonotresideinstatesandwiththeright
ofcandidacy, whichisdistinctfrom, albeitrelatedto, therighttovote.98 Boththe
RaskinandtheinitialversionoftheJacksonamendmentdealtwiththeselectionof
andvotingbypresidentialelectors.99 TheJacksonproposal, asjustnoted, givesrela-
tivelydetailedattentiontoelectionadministrationaswellastothequalificationsfor
93 See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. VIII, §5;N.Y. CONST. art. II, §§ 56.
94 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, §5.
95 Burdick, 504 U.S. at433 (quotingAndersonv. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
96 See, e.g., THEAMERICAN VOTINGEXPERIENCE:REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OFTHE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 1, 22 (Jan. 2014), available at
htp:/www.supporthevoter.gov/files/2014/01/Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf.
97 H.R.J. Res. 28, 108thCong. (2003).
98 See Raskin, supra note 82, at 56466.
99 See id. at566, 573;see also H.R.J. Res28, 108thCong. (2003).
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voting.100 So, too, manyofthestateconstitutionaltextsaddresssuchissuesasab-
senteeballots, voterregistration, andthedefinitionofresidency. Atthefederallevel,
onlytheveryrecentPocan-Ellisonproposallimitsitselftosimplydeclaringaright
tovote, withoutmore. Thismightbeastrengthasitobviatessuchcontroversialissues
aswhetherresidentsofPuertoRico, Guam, AmericanSamoa, andtheVirginIslands
gettovoteforPresidentandhavevotingrepresentationinCongress, asprovidedby
theRaskinproposal101 orwhethersame-dayregistration, currentlytheruleonlyin
thirteenstatesandtheDistrictofColumbia, shouldbemandatorynationwide.102
Thoseprovisionsmakeitlesslikelythatsuchanamendmentwouldbepassedby
Congressorberatifiedbytherequisitethree-fourthsofthestates. Ontheotherhand,
the Pocan-Ellison Amendments very succinct approach makes it much less clear what
itwouldaccomplishofitsownforceandraisestheprospectthatitwouldbeprimar-
ily expressive without actually expanding the availability of the franchise. Under
Pocan-Ellison, mostsignificantenhancementsinvotingrightswouldrequiresubse-
quentCongressionalaction.
III. HOW WOULD A RIGHT-TO-VOTE AMENDMENT ADDRESS THE
PRINCIPAL CURRENT VOTING RIGHTS ISSUES?
Thetestofwhetheraright-to-voteamendmentisworththepoliticaleffortlikely
tobeneededtogetitadoptediswhetherandtowhatextentitwouldaddressourprin-
cipalcurrentvotingrightsissues. Thatwould, ofcourse, turnonexactlywhatthe
amendmentsaysand, asI havejustindicated, recentamendmentproposalssayvery
differentthings. Still, afew generalpointscanbemade.
First, itseemsveryunlikelythatanamendmentwouldhaveanimpactonissues
thatarguablyfalwithinthedomainofvotingrights103 butdonotactualyinvolvethe
rulesandproceduresforanindividualbeingabletocastaballotandhaveitcounted
inapublicelection. Partisangerrymandering, theimpactofat-largeelectionsand
multi-memberdistrictsonminorityvotedilution, andtheShawv. Reno104 doctrines
holdingthatrace-consciousdistrictingisunconstitutionalevenifintendedtopromote
minorityrepresentation105 wouldallbeunaffectedbyanyoftheproposedversionsof
theamendment. Similarly, SupremeCourtdecisionsthatsustainedonerousrulesthat
100 H.R.J. Res. 28, 108thCong(2003).
101 See Raskin, supra note 82, at 56467.
102 See CHA & KENNEDY, supra note 53, at 79. Notably, the amendment would also
prohibitastatewhichhasadoptedsame-dayregistrationfrom repealingit, asNorthCarolina
recentlydid. Id.
103 See Gardner, supra note18, at895 (describingthebroadscopeofclaimsassertedunder
therighttovote, includingthedrawingofdistrictlines, useofsingle-memberdistricts, and
ballotaccessissues).
104 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
105 See id;see also Shawv. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996);Bushv. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996);
Millerv. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
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makeitdifficultforindependentcandidatesorminorpartiestogetonthegeneralelec-
tionballot,106 barthem from cross-nominatingmajorpartycandidates,107 orprevent
them from chalengingapartymachineintheelectionofjudicialnomineeswouldalso
probablybeunaffected.108 AlthoughProfessorRaskinhasarguedthathisamendment
wouldmakeiteasierforminorpartyandindependentcandidatestogetonthebalot,109
allhisamendmentdoesisprovidethatcitizenseighteenyearsorolderarequalified
inthejurisdictioninwhichtheyreside. Thatmighthavetheeffectofpreemptingstate
lawsthatsetdifferentqualificationssuchasanolderminimum agerequirementfor
officeholders. Butitdoesnothingtounderminetheauthorityofthestates, upheldby
theSupremeCourt, torequirethatcandidatesorpartiesdemonstratethattheyenjoy
asignificantmodicum ofsupportbeforetheycanbelistedontheballot;110 topreclude
sore loser candidates who have run and lost in a party primary from being placed
onthegeneralelectionbalotandbarvoterswhovotedinapartyprimaryfrom signing
thenominatingpetitionofanindependentgeneralelectioncandidate;111 ortobara
minor party from engaging in fusion with a major party by also nominating the
major partys candidate.112 Thoselawsdonotlimiteligibilitytobeacandidatebut
instead, by regulating the states control over the general election ballot, advance what
the Court has determined are legitimate state interests. These include: the important
stateinterestinrequiringsomepreliminaryshowingofasignificantmodicum ofsup-
port before printing the name of a political organizations candidate on the ballot
theinterest, ifnoother, inavoidingconfusion, deception, andevenfrustrationofthe
democratic process at the general election;113 the use of party primaries to winnow
out candidates114 andtherebynarrow thegeneralelectionfieldtoasmallernumber
of major contenders; and securing the stability of their political systems, including
the enactment of reasonable election regulations that may, in practice, favor the tra-
ditionaltwo-partysystem . . . andthattemperthedestabilizingeffectsofpartysplin-
tering and excessive factionalism.115 Nothinginanyoftheseproposals, including
the Raskin amendment, challenges these decisions or calls into question the Courts
justificationsforstateregulation.
Similarly, despitetheinvocationofShelby County asanimpetusforanamend-
mentthatwouldprovideforstrongerfederalprotectionoftherighttovote, itdoesnot
appearthatanyoftheproposedversionsoftheamendmentwouldaddresstheissues
106 See, e.g., Munrov. SocialistWorkersParty, 479 U.S. 189 (1986);Storerv. Brown, 415
U.S. 724 (1974);Jennessv. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
107 Timmonsv. TwinCitiesAreaNew Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
108 N.Y. StateBd. ofElectionsv. LopezTorres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
109 Raskin, supra note 82, at 57072.
110 Munro, 479 U.S. at189;Jenness, 403 U.S. at431.
111 Am. PartyofTex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974);Storer, 415 U.S. at724.
112 Timmons, 520 U.S. at351.
113 Jenness, 403 U.S. at431, 442.
114 Storer, 415 U.S. at735.
115 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 36667.
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atstakeinShelby Countythe scope of Congresss authority to define those juris-
dictionsthatcouldbesubjecttofederalpreclearanceofvotingruleschanges, andthe
preclearancerequirementitself.116 Shelby County isrootedinfederalism concerns
about the equal sovereignty of the states117 anddenyingthefederalgovernmenta
general right to review and veto state enactments before they go into effect.118 Before
Shelby County, Congresss power to require preclearance and define the covered juris-
dictionshadbeenrootedintheenforcementsectionsoftheFourteenthandFifteenth
Amendments.119 IntheabsenceofaprovisionspecificallyaddressingShelby Countys
reasoning, however, itisnotclearwhattheenforcementpowerofaright-to-vote
amendmentwouldaddwithrespecttoCongressionalpowertorequirepreclearance
anddefinecoveredjurisdictionsthatthesepriorgrantsofCongressionalenforcement
authoritydonotcurrentlyprovide.
Turningtotheimpactofanamendmentonlawsthatlimittheavailabilityofthe
franchise, noneoftheseversionsofanamendmentwouldaidoneofthelargestgroups
of people currently denied the voteresident aliensand it is unclear what they would
do for another large group of the disenfranchisedpersons convicted of a felony. In
2012, therewere13.3 milionlegalpermanentresidentslivingintheUnitedStates.120
Also known as green card holders, these are immigrants who have been granted
lawfulpermanentresidenceintheUnitedStates.121 Thevastmajorityoftheselegal
residentsareofvotingage.122 Likeotherresidents, residentaliensaresubjecttostate
andlocalregulation, taxation, andlaw enforcement, anddependonstatesandlocali-
tiesforbasicpublicservices, likepublicsafety, sanitation, andpublicschoolsfortheir
children.123 Althoughinthenineteenthcenturyasmanyassixteenstatesauthorized
alienstovote, today, withtheexceptionofahandfulofschooldistrictsthatalowalien
parentswhohavechildreninthelocalschools, few communitiesandnostatesallow
116 See ShelbyCnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
117 Id. at2623.
118 Id.
119 See PF Feb. 2014Voting Rights Act Section 4Con Position, EVERYDAY DEBATE
(Jan. 26, 2014), http://everydaydebate.blogspot.com/2014_01_01_archive.html.
120 See NANCY RYTINA, DEPT OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN 2012 (2013), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/publication/estimates-legal-permanent-resident-population-2012.
121 Id.
122 TheCensusBureauestimatesthattwenty-sixpercentofallnoncitizensintheUnited
Statesareunderagethirty-five, andthatjusttwentypercentofthatgroupisundertheageof
eighteen. Inotherwords, nearlyninety-fivepercentofnoncitizensintheUnitedStatesare
eighteenorolder. See YESENIA D. ACOSTA, ET AL., NONCITIZENS UNDER AGE 35: 20102012,
UNITEDSTATESCENSUS BUREAU (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs
/acsbr12-06.pdf. Whilemanynoncitizensarenotlegalresidentaliens, thereisnoreasonto
assumethattheagedistributionswithinthetwogroupsdiffersubstantially.
123 See RichardBriffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1525
26 (2002).
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residentalienstovote.124 Theright-to-voteamendmentproposalswoulddonothing
tochangethat. Indeed, byconsistentlydefiningtherighttovoteasarightofcitizens,
theamendmentswouldhardentheexclusionofnoncitizensbycodifyingitinthe
Constitution. Tobesure, theRaskinproposalwouldallow Congressorthestatesto
extendthevotetodisenfranchisedgroups, butneitherofthetwoversionsofthe
amendmentintroducedinCongresswoulddoso. Indeed, sucharight-to-voteamend-
mentcouldarguablybeusedasaweaponagainsttheenfranchisementofresident
aliensasexpandingthevotebeyondthegroupsthatenjoytheconstitutionalguarantee
could be treated as diluting the votes of the constitutionally protected electorate.125
Thedisenfranchisementofpersonsconvictedofafelonyhasbeenamajorsore
spotincurrentdiscussionsofvotingrightsandafrequenttargetofreform efforts. A
striking 5.85 million Americans are prohibited from voting due to state laws that
disenfranchisecitizensconvictedoffelonycharges.126 Inelevenstates, disenfranchise-
mentextendstoindividualswhohavecompletedtheirprisonsentencesandareno
longeronprobationorparole;theseindividualsconstituteforty-fivepercentofthe
entirepopulationdeniedthevotebyfelondisenfranchisementlaws.127 Theselaws
haveadisproportionateimpactonmenandpeopleofcolor. OneinthirteenAfrican
Americansofvotingageisdisenfranchised, andinthreestatesmorethantwentyper-
centofBlackadultsaredeniedthefranchisebytheselaws.128 Aspreviouslynoted,
inRichardson v. Ramirez129 theSupremeCourtrejectedtheargumentthatsuchlaws
violate the Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause, finding that the lan-
guage in the Amendments reduction in representation sectionwhich would re-
ducerepresentationintheHouseofRepresentativesforstatesthatdenythevoteto
otherwise eligible citizensexcepting from application of the reduction rule laws
124 Id.
125 A versionofthisissuehascomeupintheUnitedStatesinsomesituationswhere
localitieshaveenfranchisednonresidentsorcityresidentshavebeenallowedtovoteinthe
schoolboardelectionsofthecountyinwhichthecityislocatedeventhoughcitychildren
attendcity, notcounty, schools. See RichardBriffault, Who Rules at Home?:One Person/
One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 396401 (1993). Germanys
highestcourthasheldthatstatelawsgrantingthesuffragetocertainaliensviolatedthecon-
stitutional requirement of rule by the people and that popular sovereignty means rule by
citizens alone. See GeraldL. Neuman, We Are The People: Alien Suffrage in German
and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INTL L. 259, 28788 (1992).
126 See JEAN CHUNG, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER 1 (2013), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_Felony%20Disenfranchisement
%20Primer.pdf.
127 Id.
128 Id. at2. ClaimsthatfelondisenfranchisementlawsviolatetheVotingRightsActhave
beenrejected. See, e.g., Farrakhanv. Gregoire, 623 F.3d990 (9thCir. 2010) (enbanc);
Simmonsv. Galvin, 575 F.3d24, 41 (1stCir. 2009);Haydenv. Pataki, 449 F.3d305, 323
(2dCir. 2006) (enbanc);Johnsonv. GovernorofFla., 405 F.3d1214, 1234 (11thCir. 2005)
(enbanc).
129 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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that deny the franchise for participation in rebellion, or other crime, implicitly
authorizeddisfranchisementforconvictionofacrime.130 Proponentsofaright-to-
voteamendmentappeartoassumethatsuchanamendmentwouldinvalidatefelon
disenfranchisementlaws, eitherofitsownforceorbyempoweringCongresstodo
so.131 Butthereisnoreasontoassumethat. Noneoftheseproposalsaddressesfelon
disenfranchisement. ThetextoftheFourteenthAmendment, Richardson, andthe
manystateconstitutionalright-to-voteprovisionsthateitherexpresslydisenfranchise
personsconvictedofafelonyordirectorpermittheirlegislaturestodososuggestthat
withinourconstitutionalculture,132 felondisfranchisementisconsideredtobecon-
sistentwiththerighttovote. Withoutaprovisionexpresslyaddressingtherightsof
felons, itisquitepossibleifnotlikelythataright-to-voteamendmentwouldbecon-
strued by the Supreme Court to harmonize with the participation in rebelion, or other
crime provision of the Fourteenth Amendment and with the Richardson decision.
Althoughitdoesnothingforresidentaliensorpersonsconvictedofafelony, the
Raskinversionwouldaddsomenew voters: residentsoftheDistrictofColumbia
wouldobtainrepresentationinCongress, andPuertoRico, AmericanSamoa, Guam,
theNorthernMarianasIslands, andtheVirginIslandswouldbeentitledtoparticipate
intheselectionofpresidentialelectors.133 Thatwouldaddroughly4.4 milionpeople
tothepopulationrepresentedintheElectoralCollege134 andalmost600,000 tothose
withvotingrepresentativesinCongress.135 Inasensethisdoesnotaddtotherightto
votepresumably voting age citizens in these jurisdictions could already vote in local
or jurisdiction-wide electionsbut it would provide new representation in the federal
governmentforthoseotherwisequalifiedtovote. TheJacksonandPocan-Ellison
amendmentsdonotaddressthequestionofwhetheradditionalnonstatejurisdictions
oughttohavevotingparticipationinthefederalgovernment.
Apart from the Raskin amendments attention to the role of nonstate citizens in
federalelections, theprincipalimpactofthevariousright-to-voteproposalswouldbe
inaddressingthecumbersomeandincreasinglyonerousregistrationandvotingregu-
lations imposed by many states. These rules and proceduresphoto identification
requirements, proof-of-citizenshiprequirements, in-personregistrationrequirements
orextrarulesformail-inoronlineregistration, limitsonvolunteervoterregistration
drives, registrationlistpurges, re-registrationrequirementsforthosewhomove,
130 Id.
131 See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 82, at 56770; Nelson, supra note5.
132 Bycontrast, theSupremeCourtofCanadahasheldthattheprovisionoftheCanadian
CharterofRightsandFreedomsprotectingtherighttovoterequiredtheinvalidationofalaw
denyingthefranchisetoindividualsincarceratedinapenalinstitutionforasentenceoftwo
yearsormore. See Sauvév. Canada, [2002]3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.).
133 See Raskin, supra note 82, at 56567, 573.
134 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012 817
tbl.1313, available at https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1313.pdf.
135 See Raskin, supra note82, at564.
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limitsontheavailabilityofabsenteeballots, evenantiquatedorerror-pronevoting
machineryall make it more difficult for qualified voters to exercise their right to
vote. TheJacksonproposalwentfurthestintacklingtheseadministrativerestrictions
onvotinginmandatingsame-dayregistration, expresslyempoweringCongresstoset
electionperformancestandards, anddirectingthatallfederalandstatevotingregu-
lations be narrowly tailored to produce efficient and honest elections.136 Thatwould
liberalizetheregistrationprocessnationwide, authorizeCongresstoregulateallelec-
tionsandnotjustelectionsforfederaloffice, andrequiretheSupremeCourttoscruti-
nizevotingrulesmorestrictlythanthecurrent, relativelydeferentialBurdick v. Takushi
balancing test that the Court employs for voting rules which impose less than severe
restrictionsonthefranchise.137
TheRaskinandPocan-Ellisonamendmentproposalsdonotdirectlyaddressthe
burdensonthevoteimposedbystateelectionadministration. Neitheronitsownterms
modifiesanyadministrativepracticesorcodifiesamorestringentstandardofjudicial
review. But each does include an enforce-by-appropriate-legislation section138 which
wouldarguablyempowerCongresstoaddressanddisplacestateandlocaladministra-
tivepracticesthatdenyorabridgetherighttovote, eveninstateandlocalelections.
AlongwiththeJacksonproposal, theseotherright-to-voteamendmentswouldprovide
supportfortheargumentthatvotingoughttobeseenasanationalright, andthat,
eventhoughelectionswouldlikelystillbeadministeredatthestateandlocallevel,
Congress would have the power to regulate the Time, Place, and Manner of state
aswellasfederalelections.
That would be a significant step, particularly in light of the Courts federalism-
basedendorsementofstatecontrolofelectionsasrecentlyseeninShelby County and
Inter Tribal. Itwouldprovideanimportantfoundationfordirectfederalregulation
oftheelectoralprocessandforthepreemptionofrestrictivestatelaws, ratherthan
limitingCongresstotheincentiveeffectsoftyingadministrativeimprovementrequire-
mentstofederalfundingorregulatingelectionsforfederalofficeandhopingthe
stateswillabidebythesamerulesforstateandlocalofficetoavoidthecostsoftwo
separatesetsofelectionrules. However, tobeeffectiveinreformingstateelection
rules, the Raskin and Pocan-Ellison measuresand even to some extent the Jackson
proposalwould depend on subsequent action by Congress. Given the paralyzing
effectoftheincreasinglyintensepoliticalpolarizationwithinCongress, andthelikeli-
hoodthatmeasurestoimposefederalvotingrulesthatwoulddisplacemorerestrictive
stateregulationswouldtriggerconflictingpartisanresponses, gettingCongressto
enactsuchanelectionadministrationlawmightentailalmostasstrenuousapolitical
effortasgettingaright-to-voteamendmentpassedinthefirstplace.
One irony of this is that the more specific an amendment iswhether in giving
theDistrictofColumbiarepresentationinCongress, mandatingsame-dayregistration,
136 H.R.J. Res. 28, 108thCong. (2003).
137 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 43334 (1992).
138 See H.R.J. Res. 44, 113thCong. (2013);Raskin, supra note82, at573.
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or barring disenfranchisement for conviction for a felonythe more likely it wil suc-
ceedinitsintendedpurposeifratified;however, thoseveryspecificsmaybemore
likelytodraw oppositiontothemeasureandpreventitsratification. Conversely, a
relativelyanodynemeasurethatsimplyenshrinestherighttovoteintheConstitution
might be more likely to passit is hard to see what the argument on the merits against
it would bebut it is likely to accomplish littleofitsownforceandwillinsteadpunt
thebatleovertheprotectionofvotingrightsagainstrestrictiveregulationtoCongress
ortheSupremeCourt. Sucharight-to-voteamendmentwouldsurelyandappropriately
expressthecentralvalueofvotinginourdemocracy. Butinpracticeitwoulddolittle
to correct the constitutional gaps, restrictive regulations, and Court decisions that
providemuchofthecurrentimpetusforaright-to-voteamendment. Suchanamend-
ment would leave the right to vote close to where it is todayin the hands of state
legislatures, Congress, andthecourts. Ifthatisthecase, onemightapplaudtheideaof
suchanamendmentbutbeuncertainaboutputtingalotofeffortintogetingitpassed,
and might instead choose to focus on subconstitutional measuresfederal, state and
locallawsandadministrativereforms139that could provide voters and potential voters
greaterbenefitsintheshortterm andwithouttheneedtoamendtheconstitution.
139 See, e.g., CHA&KENNEDY, supra note53 (discussingothermethodsofvotingreform);
THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE, supra note96 (same).
